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Abstract – The publication of the Thun Group’s discussion paper The Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: An Interpretation for Banks represented a critical step on the way 
to delineate the relationship between the financial sector and human rights: the document lays 
the foundations for the adoption of the first ever comprehensive guide on how universal banks 
should operationalise their responsibility to respect human rights. As the arguments offered by 
the Thun Group are likely to influence the way in which numerous financial institutions 
integrate human rights into their operations, this article offers a critical assessment of the 
discussion paper. Notwithstanding several positive features, the Thun Group relies on a faulty 
subsidiary approach, avoids fundamental issues like access to effective remedy and downplays 
the importance of effective engagement with affected stakeholders. 
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1. Introduction 
In June 2011 the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council unanimously ‘endorsed’ the Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (GPs), the final document of Professor John Ruggie’s 
mandate as Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises.
1
 The GPs offer the first authoritative 
guidance on how companies should meet their responsibility to respect human rights.
2
 In short, 
business enterprises are expected to have in place policies and processes appropriate to their size 
                                                 
1
 John G. Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework (Human Rights Council, March 21, 2011). For a comprehensive account of Ruggie’s 
mandate as SRSG, see John G. Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company, 2013). 
2
 The governance framework proposed by Ruggie rests on three pillars: (1) the state duty to protect against human rights 
abuses by third parties, including business; (2) the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and (3) greater 
access by victims to effective remedy, both judicial and non-judicial. See also John G. Ruggie, Protect, Respect and 
Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights (Human Rights Council, April 7, 2008). 
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and circumstances, including a policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human 
rights, a human rights due-diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they 
address their impacts on human rights, and processes to enable the remediation of any adverse 
human rights impacts they cause or to which they contribute. 
International organizations, standard-setting bodies and national governments rapidly embraced the 
key elements of the corporate responsibility to respect for human rights. To mention a few 
examples, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) updated its 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and added a chapter on human rights explicitly drawing on 
the GPs;
3
 ISO26000, a new social responsibility standard adopted by 93% of the membership of the 
International Organization for Standardization, includes a human rights clause that is closely 
aligned with Ruggie’s conclusions;4 the British government published a National Action Plan on 
business and human rights in which it expressly requests that ‘the GPs guide the approach UK 
companies should take to respect human rights wherever they operate’.5  
The diffusion of the expectation that corporations should act with due diligence to avoid infringing 
on the rights of others and to address adverse impacts with which they are involved is a positive 
development. However, as acknowledged by Ruggie himself, the definition of the basic features of 
the corporate responsibility to respect human rights only represents ‘the end of the beginning’.6 This 
is particularly true because the GPs 
are not intended as a tool kit, simply to be taken off the shelf and plugged in. While the 
Principles themselves are universally applicable, the means by which they are realized will 
reflect the fact that we live in a world of ... 80,000 transnational enterprises, 10 times as many 
subsidiaries and countless millions of national firms, most of which are small and medium-sized 
enterprises. When it comes to means for implementation, therefore, one size does not fit all.
7
  
In other words, since the GPs apply to all business enterprises, both transnational and others, 
regardless of their size, sector, location, ownership and structure, they cannot but offer generic 
guidance. Specific details are left unspecified. 
How to address the challenge of ‘fine-tuning’ the UN document? So far, the prevalent strategy has 
been to adopt a sectoral approach. Even though each company is different from another, those 
belonging to the same industry share similar problems and potential solutions. Thus, the European 
Commission released human rights guidance for three business sectors: employment and 
recruitment, information and communication technology (ICT), and oil and gas.
8
 The Global 
Network Initiative, a multi-stakeholder group of ICT companies, investors and NGOs, adopted 
Principles and Implementation Guidelines on issues related to privacy and freedom of expression.
9
 
                                                 
3
 OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011, Chapter 4. 
4
 International Organization for Standardization, ISO 26000: Guidance on Social Responsibility, 2010, Clause 6.3. 
5
 Government of the United Kingdom, Good Business: Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, September 4, 2013, Chapter 3. 
6
 Ruggie, Guiding Principles, Para. 13. 
7
 Ibid., Para. 15. See also OHCHR, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide 
(Geneva: United Nations, 2012), 3. 
8
 See, for instance, Shift and Institute for Human Rights and Business, Oil and Gas Sector Guide on Implementing the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (European Commission, 2012). 
9
 Global Network Initiative, “Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy,” 2008, 
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/principles/index.php. 
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IPIECA, the global oil and gas industry association for environmental and social issues, prepared a 
practical guide to assist companies in implementing human rights due diligence.
10
 
Universal banks – that is, those financial institutions that combine the aspects of both commercial 
banking and investment banking – find themselves in a similar situation to other businesses. Rae 
Lindsay and Anthony Crockett argued that the GPs ‘offer only high-level guidance’ and ‘the precise 
steps that financial institutions will need to take to adapt their policies, procedures and other 
governance arrangements remain unclear’.11 According to Mary Dowell-Jones, the core challenge 
for the business and human rights agenda in the financial sector is to ‘focus on defining principles 
and methodologies that are practically applicable to the complex array of products, processes and 
services that make up modern finance, using the UN Guiding Principles as the normative 
framework’.12 Motoko Aizawa emphasised that the OECD Guidelines ‘are intended to apply to the 
financial sector, but how they are to be implemented by the sector is not evident’.13 
The production of human rights guidance specifically tailored for the financial sector is important 
not only because banks, as any other company, can abuse the human rights of their employees, 
customers and other stakeholders. Financial institutions are rather special businesses: they can be 
‘invisible players to affected communities or victims on the ground ... “but for” their financial role, 
many human rights abuses would not happen’.14 In addition, ‘whether as a percentage of GDP, as a 
percentage of corporate profits, in terms of financial depth or compared with the growth of trade, 
the financial sector has become proportionately more important in the overall economy in the last 
three decades’.15 Financial activities can have repercussions far beyond the borders of the country 
where they take place and the sphere of influence of the company that manage them.
16
 
Financial institutions are aware of their challenges in implementing the GPs, and have moved the 
first steps to clarify their responsibilities. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private 
                                                 
10
 IPIECA, Human Rights Due Diligence Process: A Practical Guide to Implementation for Oil and Gas Companies, 
2012. 
11
 Rae Lindsay and Antony Crockett, “Does Money Mind If We Say It’s Evil?,” International Financial Law Review 
30, no. 6 (2011): 111–13. A new brief published by Clifford Chance in May 2014 confirms that the GPs “have acted as 
a catalyst for financial institutions to introduce or to expand policies and procedures around human rights due diligence 
although the sector is at an early stage of examining the full implications”: Roger Leese, Rae Lindsay, and Steve 
Nickelsburg, Business and Human Rights: Emerging Issues for Financial Institutions, May 2014, 1. 
12
 Mary Dowell-Jones, “Financial Institutions and Human Rights,” Human Rights Law Review 13, no. 3 (2013): 428. 
13
 Motoko Aizawa, “Cash, Crisis, Conscience: How Can the Financial Sector Ensure It Respects Human Rights?,” 
Institute for Human Rights and Business, July 18, 2011, 
http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/guest/cash_crisis_conscience.html. Ruggie himself “indicated that more granular 
work would be required in order for governments, businesses and other stakeholders to turn the GPs into rules and tools 
for specific industry sectors and operating contexts, different scales of operations, various forms of financial 
intermediaries, and so on”: John G. Ruggie, “Progress in Corporate Accountability,” IHRB Commentary, February 4, 
2013, http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/board/progress-in-corporate-accountability.html. 
14
 BankTrack, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Sector Banks, 2010, 2. See also Danish Institute for Human 
Rights, Values Added: The Challenge of Integrating Human Rights into the Financial Sector, 2010, 6. Gaia Ghirardi, 
head of Group Sustainability at UniCredit, recognises that the position of the financial sector relative to potential human 
rights abuses “deserves special attention”: Gaia Ghirardi, “Understanding and Managing the Financial Sector’s 
Responsibilities in Terms of Human Rights: The UniCredit Experience,” Notize Di Politeia 106 (2012): 67. 
15
 Center of Concern, Submission to the Working Group on Business and Human Rights in the Occasion of Working 
Group’s Visit  to United States, April 29, 2013, 1.  The “shadow banking system”, which is comprised of financial 
institutions that are outside the traditional banking regulatory structure but which engage in banking functions like 
granting credit, should also be taken into consideration: see The Economist, “An Ignominious History: Shadow 
Banking,” May 8, 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/05/special-report-shadow-banking. 
16
 For a more general discussion, see David Kinley, An Awkward Intimacy: Why Finance and Human Rights Must 
Learn to Love Each Other (forthcoming, 2014). 
    DRAFT – Please, do not cite or circulate without permission  4 
 
 
 
sector lending arm of the World Bank Group, included an explicit reference to the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights in its Performance Standards – that is, the environmental and 
social requirements that clients must apply in the case of IFC direct investments.
17
 The latest 
version of the Equator Principles, a risk management framework adopted by more than 70 financial 
institutions for determining, assessing and managing environmental and social risk in the projects 
they finance or advise on, is based on the updated IFC Performance Standards and explicitly 
requests that clients, if appropriate, complement their assessment documentation with specific 
human rights due diligence, as referenced in the GPs.
18
 
The problem with these initiatives (as well as with other industry projects like the OECD Common 
Approach on Export Credit)
19
 is that their focus is limited to a specific type of activity: project 
finance (and, only more recently, a few related services too).
20
 The narrow scope is regrettable. The 
provisions of the Equator Principles can easily be circumvented by offering other products (such as 
general corporate loans or bond underwriting).
21
 Financial institutions should therefore produce 
(and receive) guidance on how to conduct human rights due diligence in all their activities.
22
 This 
explains the significance of the creation of the Thun Group of Banks. 
The Thun Group was launched by four European banks (Barclays, Credit Suisse, UBS and 
UniCredit) in 2011.
23
 The four banks recognised that the GPs ‘do not – nor do they intend to – 
provide specific guidance for each industrial sector’ and that ‘further interpretation work is required 
to understand how the Guiding Principles should be implemented within specific industries, 
including the banking sector’. The objective of the collaboration is to produce ‘a practical 
application guide setting out the challenges and best practice examples of operationalising the 
Guiding Principles in universal banks’.24  
In October 2013, the Group (enlarged by the participation of three additional members: BBVA, 
ING Bank N.V. and RBS Group) released its first public document, a discussion paper entitled The 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: An interpretation for banks. Several 
commentators emphasised that the publication of the paper represents a critical juncture on the way to 
                                                 
17
 IFC, Sustainability Framework, 2012. 
18
 See Paul Q. Watchman, Angela Delfino, and Juliette Addison, “EP 2: The Revised Equator Principles: Why Hard-
Nosed Bankers Are Embracing Soft Law Principles,” Law & Fin. Mkt. Rev. 1 (2007): 85; John M. Conley and Cynthia 
A. Williams, “Global Banks as Global Sustainability Regulators?: The Equator Principles,” Law & Policy 33, no. 4 
(2011): 542–75; Donald H. Schepers, “The Equator Principles: A Promise in Progress?,” Corporate Governance 11, no. 
1 (2011): 90–106; Christopher Wright, “Global Banks, the Environment, and Human Rights: The Impact of the Equator 
Principles on Lending Policies and Practices,” Global Environmental Politics 12, no. 1 (2012): 56–77. 
19
 OECD Council, Recommendation of the Council on Common Approaches for Officially Supported Export Credits 
and Environmental and Social Due Diligence, June 28, 2012. 
20
 For a comprehensive introduction to the topic, see Sheldon Leader and David Ong, Global Project Finance, Human 
Rights and Sustainable Development (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
21
 Mary Dowell-Jones showed how, despite all the very visible, lengthy human rights controversies attached to Vedanta, 
this company was able to raise significant amounts of financing and easily circumvent the strictures of the human 
rights/finance initiatives described above: Dowell-Jones, “Financial Institutions and Human Rights,” 460. 
22
 The UN Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) is another initiative that aims to integrate environmental and 
social issues into financial activities. The PRI has just started specific work on human rights, through a collaborative 
engagement in the extractives with a focus on joint ventures (on file with the author). 
23
 The name of the Group comes from the Swiss town where bank representatives met for the two initial workshops. 
24
 Thun Group, Statement on the “Guiding Principles for the Implementation of the United Nations ‘protect, Respect 
and Remedy’ Framework” on Human Rights", October 19, 2011. 
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delineate the human rights responsibilities of the financial sector.
25
 According to Swisspeace, the 
document shows, for the first time, ‘a common understanding amongst the companies involved that 
respect for human rights is an integral part of the business, that taking voluntary and proactive 
action is better than waiting for legal requirements to be enforced, and that adopting a joint 
approach with competitors facilitates the internal persuasion process’.26 At the 2013 UN Annual 
Forum on Business and Human Rights, the document was hailed as a ‘paradigm shift’ for thinking 
on human rights in the banking sector, in spite of its shortcomings.
27
 Sudeep Chakravarti argues that 
the paper is ‘a must-read for financiers, their clients, corporate governance and human rights 
specialists, and teachers and students of business schools ... the weight of the names involved in 
Thun Group alone demands it. To have guidelines enunciated by such a group is priceless. Besides, 
even public relations exercises are sometimes known to evolve into public policy’.28  
The foundational aspect of the Thun Group’s discussion paper makes it particularly important that 
banks ‘get it right’ from the very beginning and avoid any misinterpretation of their responsibilities. 
A false start can have long-lasting repercussions (in terms of both poor risk management and 
adverse human rights impacts). This article therefore responds to the objective of the document – 
that is, ‘to generate constructive dialogue among banks and other stakeholders’29 – and offers a 
critical assessment of its main arguments. The article is structured as follows. The second section 
concentrates on the adoption of human rights policies. The third section focuses on human rights 
due diligence processes. The fourth section emphasises four general shortcomings: the Thun Group 
relies on a faulty subsidiary approach, ignores the responsibility to provide access to effective 
remedy, avoids the foundational principles and the principles on ‘issues of context’, and downplays 
the importance of effective engagement with potential victims. The conclusion emphasises that, 
given the numerous unresolved dilemmas around banks’ human rights responsibilities, meaningful 
consultation with affected stakeholders is fundamental to ensure the future success of the initiative. 
 
2. The Thun Group and the statement of policy 
GP 16 requires that all business enterprises have in place a policy commitment to meet their 
responsibility to respect human rights. In addition, it illustrates how this statement of policy should 
be adopted. For instance, it should be informed by relevant internal and/or external expertise, and be 
publicly available.  
The Thun Group’s discussion paper not only visibly acknowledges that ‘a statement of policy 
should be developed which aims to express the bank’s public commitment to respect human rights’ 
(6),
30
 but also heavily draws on the GPs to describe how this commitment should be expressed. 
Among the numerous positive elements, the seven banks recognise that it ‘is not sufficient to ring-
                                                 
25
 The relevance of the document derives not only from the important role played by global banks in the world 
economy. Banks are general businesses that include asset management units, insurance divisions, etc. As such, guidance 
for banks automatically provides guidance for institutional investors as well.  
26
 KOFF, Newsletter (Bern: Swiss Peace Foundation, March 2014), 10. 
27
 Human Rights Council, Summary of Discussions of the Forum on Business and Human Rights, April 15, 2014, para. 
95. 
28
 Sudeep Chakravarti, “A Human Rights Code for Banks,” October 3, 2013, 
http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/nGCMPDRc4WLG2C9UUkAt2J/A-human-rights-code-for-banks.html. 
29
 Thun Group, Statement: “The Guiding Principles: An Interpretation for Banks,” October 2, 2013. 
30
 For the sake of readability, references to specific pages of the Thun Group’s discussion paper are along the text, 
between brackets. 
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fence a policy in one part of the organisation’. As such, the statement should ‘apply to all parts of 
the business’ (6). The banks also concede that staff ‘may lack confidence in interpreting the policy 
and guidance and need to know they are supported in considering the issues’. It is therefore ‘critical 
to seek senior management buy-in at the outset’ (7). Furthermore, the Thun Group clarifies the 
expectation that the statement of policy should be reflected in operational policies and procedures 
necessary to embed it throughout the business enterprise by emphasising that this document should 
‘generate awareness and understanding throughout the organisation of the importance and relevance 
of human rights issues to business decisions’, ‘signpost tools and guidance to assist personnel in 
dealing with issues in their part of the bank’, and ‘establish clear accountabilities and allocation of 
responsibility’ (6). 
Notwithstanding these (and other) encouraging features, the discussion paper has two important 
shortcomings. First, the banks do not mention the need to align their policy commitment with 
internal incentives.
31
 The GPs are clear that business enterprises ‘need to strive for coherence 
between their responsibility to respect human rights and policies and procedures that govern their 
wider business activities and relationships. This should include, for example, policies and 
procedures that set financial and other performance incentives for personnel’.32 The inclusion of 
human rights indicators in the performance assessments of staff across all relevant functions has 
proven fundamental in changing the behaviour of other businesses, like pharmaceutical companies. 
Managers within GlaxoSmithKline’s Developing Countries and Market Access Unit enjoy incentive 
schemes that reward volume growth rather than profit. This means that it is now in managers’ 
interests to increase access to medicines.
33
 
Second, the Thun Group is silent on the Human Rights Council’s recommendation that the 
statement of policy should stipulate the enterprise’s human rights expectations not only of 
personnel, but also of ‘business partners and other parties directly linked to its operations, products 
or services’.34 According to the OHCHR, this is particularly important because it ‘provides a 
starting point from which the enterprise can better leverage respect for human rights in these 
relationships, should this be necessary. ... Conversely, if it is not clear that these expectations with 
regard to human rights are a firm policy of the enterprise, they can easily become “negotiable” and 
be sidelined in particular relationships or circumstances’.35 
 
3. The Thun Group and the due diligence process 
The section of the discussion paper that concentrates on human rights due diligence offers a similar 
picture to the one that focuses on the statement of policy: positive features sit alongside with serious 
deficiencies. Starting from the bright side, the GPs are clear that human rights risks are to be 
understood not as risks to the company, but as risks to vulnerable individuals: human rights due 
diligence ‘can be included within broader enterprise risk-management systems, provided that it goes 
                                                 
31
 The importance of aligning remuneration structures with responsible decision-making was highlighted also by 
Rathbone Greenbank Investments and Ecumenical Council for Corporate Responsibility, The Banks and Society: Trust 
Rebuilt?, March 2014, 11. 
32
 Ruggie, Guiding Principles, Commentary to GP 16. 
33
 Francis West, “Five Ways to Restore Public Trust in Big Business,” Politics.co.uk, April 9, 2014, 
http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2014/04/09/comment-five-ways-to-restore-the-public-s-trust-in-big-busin. 
34
 Ruggie, Guiding Principles, GP 16. 
35
 OHCHR, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide, 27. 
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beyond simply identifying and managing material risks to the company itself, to include risks to 
rights-holders’.36 The Thun Group welcomes this interpretation and highlights that ‘the due 
diligence outlined by the Guiding Principles requires that businesses, including banks, take a 
broader view of their potential impacts rather than focusing solely on their own commercial and 
reputational risks’ (9). The suggestion is to develop ‘a risk management model that goes beyond 
traditional parameters, to address (identify, manage and mitigate) human rights risks to external 
stakeholders, i.e., which identifies and assesses potential adverse impacts on rights holders as well 
as risks to the bank itself’ (5).  
The seven banks also acknowledge that ‘all human rights are relevant’ (9), that ‘due diligence is an 
ongoing process, not something to be completed once and not revisited’ (16) and that ‘heightened 
attention needs to be paid to groups who are particularly vulnerable to human rights violations in a 
specific context, even though the bank’s connection to these violations may be remote’ (10). The 
last statement almost copy-pastes the GPs, according to which ‘business enterprises should pay 
special attention to any particular human rights impacts on individuals from groups or populations 
that may be at heightened risk of vulnerability or marginalization’.37  
Lastly, the discussion paper puts forward the sensible recommendation to adapt the due diligence 
process to the different financial services offered. Banks do business with many types of clients: 
from individuals via retail and private banking, to commercial businesses via corporate and 
investment banking, to investors via asset management activities. The Thun Group rightly argues 
that a one-size-fits-all approach ‘will not be feasible across the many relationships, transactions and 
activities of a multi-national bank’ (9). As such, ‘each type of client and product range has its own 
risk profile and requires tailored risk management approaches’ (10). This recommendation is in line 
with the analysis of the Danish Institute for Human Rights: ‘the wide spectrum of financial actors 
and instruments will require different methodologies in a tool to measure human rights compliance 
... emphasis must be placed on developing methodologies that are specific to particular asset 
classes’.38 
Moving to the most problematic aspects, it is regrettable that the Thun Group completely ignores a 
fundamental element of human rights due diligence: tracking. The discussion paper never mentions 
this activity. Yet, the GP are clear that business enterprises should monitor the effectiveness of their 
response in order to verify whether adverse human rights impacts are being addressed.
39
 The 
OHCHR specifies that tracking is necessary ‘in order for a business enterprise to know if its human 
rights policies are being implemented optimally, whether it has responded effectively to the 
identified human rights impacts, and to drive continuous improvement’.40 
                                                 
36
 Ruggie, Guiding Principles, Commentary to GP 17. 
37
 Ibid., Commentary to GP 18. 
38
 Danish Institute for Human Rights, Values Added: The Challenge of Integrating Human Rights into the Financial 
Sector, 5. The Institute for Human Rights and Business also argues that different types of assets “will have different 
human rights impacts and opportunities associated with them. Developing tools to better understand the human rights 
impacts of types of assets, whether these are property, commodities or other resources, will help investors to be more 
precise in their analysis and engagement”: Institute for Human Rights and Business, Investing the Rights Way: A Guide 
for Investors on Business and Human Rights, 2013, 57, http://www.ihrb.org/publications/reports/investing-the-rights-
way.html. 
39
 Ruggie, Guiding Principles, GP 20. 
40
 Ibid., Commentary to GP 20. 
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If tracking is forgotten, the Thun Group covers human rights reporting. However, the seven banks 
seem to suggest that this activity is purely voluntary. The discussion paper states that  
banks may wish to report on the following factors in their sustainability reporting or other 
communications:  
- voluntary human rights standards that the bank is signatory to;  
- policies and procedures to identify and mitigate human rights risks;  
- approach to human rights issues specific for sectors in which bank’s clients operate;  
- governance process for dealing with human rights; 
- staff training on human rights (17). 
Ruggie would disagree with this interpretation of banks’ responsibilities. According to the GPs, 
businesses ‘should’, not ‘may wish to’, be prepared to communicate how they address their human 
rights impacts, ‘particularly when concerns are raised by or on behalf of affected stakeholders’.41 
Higher transparency is considered a key development in the financial sector. Back in 2003, more 
than a hundred NGOs signed the Collevecchio Declaration and argued that financial institutions 
‘must be transparent to stakeholders, not only through robust, regular and standardized disclosure, 
but also by being responsive to stakeholder needs for specialized information on their policies, 
procedures and transactions’.42 The Swedish and Norwegian OECD National Contact Points 
supported these demands. In its conclusion regarding a special instance against Nordea as partial 
financer of the Finnish company Botnia’s construction of a pulp mill in Uruguay, the two NCPs 
encouraged ‘actors in the financial sector to practice as much transparency and freedom of 
information as possible. In order to foster greater understanding among the general public for their 
activities, it is essential that companies be sensitive to the public’s increasing demands for 
information’.43 The argument offered by Andreas Missbach is forceful: if banks ‘want the public to 
believe that they are serious about their respect for human rights they will not only have to develop 
a comprehensive human rights policy and adequate sectoral due diligence standards, but they will 
actually have to allow the public to see them’.44 
As far as human rights assessment and integration are concerned, the way in which the Thun Group 
recommends to prioritise action represents a serious misunderstanding of the GPs.
45
 According to 
the discussion paper, banks should ‘prioritize the assessment of their potential adverse impacts on 
human rights and related risks by using two criteria: first, the impact on the rights holders 
themselves (severity and number of affected people), and second, the bank’s connection to these 
                                                 
41
 Ruggie, Guiding Principles, GP 21. 
42
 Collevecchio Declaration: The Role and Responsibility of Financial Institutions, 2003, 
http://www.evb.ch/es/p25001979.html. 
43
 Swedish National Contact Point, Statement by the Swedish National Contact Point (NCP) for the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises - with the Full Support of Norway’s NCP - in Connection with a Complaint from the 
Argentine Environmental Organisation CEDHA against Nordea, January 1, 2008, 2, 
http://oecdwatch.org/cases/Case_123. 
44
 Andreas Missbach, “Without Map or Compass. Credit Suisse, UBS and Human Rights” (Berne Declaration, 2010), 
16. 
45
 Further research confirms that financial institutions have a poor understanding of the core concepts of the GPs and the 
OECD Guidelines. The findings from a recent report by Sustainable Finance Advisory “indicate that some of the 
concerns expressed by FIs appear to, in part, reflect a misunderstanding of some of the main concepts from the OECD 
Guidelines and their implications (i.e. linkage and leverage). Thus, several panellists indicated that it will be very 
important to effectively communicate the expectations and definitions of these main concepts”: OECD, Summary 
Report (OECD Global Forum on Responsible Business Conduct, June 27, 2013), 15. 
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adverse impacts’ (10). In other words, ‘it will not be possible to evaluate every impact of every 
business decision regardless of proximity’ (9). 
The idea that proximity, or the level of connection between the bank and the human rights abuse, 
should be used as a criteria to prioritise action is new to the business and human rights community. 
The GPs are clear: severity, nothing else, should inform prioritization.
46
 The OHCHC clarifies that  
it may not always be possible for an enterprise to address all adverse human rights impact 
immediately. ... If these impacts cannot reasonably be addressed all at once, the focus must be 
on those that would cause the greatest harm to people. That means prioritizing those impacts 
that are, or would be, most severe in their scope or scale or where a delayed response would 
render them irremediable.
47
  
Thus, if a bank’s asset management unit is both a majority shareholder in a company which is 
involved in a numerous cases of workplace discrimination and a minority shareholder in a company 
which is accused of complicity in the killings of labour leaders by a repressive regime, the bank 
should prioritise action in the latter case. The proximity of the first abuse does not offset the 
severity of the second one. 
Importantly, the fact that severity of human rights abuses is the only factor that should inform 
prioritization of action does not mean that the GPs completely disregard proximity between the 
bank and its human rights impacts. If one equates proximity with leverage (assuming that closeness 
is positively correlated with the ability to effect change in the wrongful practices of another party), 
this element serves to define what actions a bank is required to undertake (once human rights have 
already been prioritised on the basis of severity). When a bank identifies a risk of adverse human 
rights impact linked to its operations, products or services and caused by a party with which it has a 
business relationship (such as a loan for general corporate purposes), the GPs suggest the following 
approach: 
 the bank should always exercise its leverage to mitigate any impact to the greatest extent 
possible;  
 if the bank lacks leverage, there may be ways to increase it. Leverage may be augmented, 
for example, by ‘offering capacity-building or other incentives to the related entity, or 
collaborating with other actors’;48  
 when there is no leverage (and no way to increase it), the bank should consider ending the 
relationship.
49
  
                                                 
46
 Ruggie, Guiding Principles, GP 24. 
47
 OHCHR, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide, 82. 
48
 Ruggie, Guiding Principles, Commentary to GP 19. 
49
 There are numerous examples of banks terminating their business relationships with abusive clients. RBS (and a few 
other European banks) stopped underwriting bonds of the Belarus government: “RBS Agrees to Cease Belarus Work,” 
BBC News, August 29, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14706646. Santander suspended its funding for 
Brazil’s hugely controversial Santo Antonio dam, citing environmental and social concerns: Survival International, 
“Santander Bank Reports Suspension of Funding for Controversial Brazilian Dam,” May 5, 2011, 
http://www.survivalinternational.org/news/7255. The only exception to the schema outlined in the article is when the 
business relationship is deemed “crucial” to the company. However, the GPs define a crucial business relationship as 
one that “provides a product or service that is essential to the enterprise’s business, and for which no reasonable 
alternative source exists”: Ruggie, Guiding Principles, Commentary to GP19 It is difficult to imagine any financial 
activity which meets this requirement. The exception is therefore not relevant for the banking sector. 
    DRAFT – Please, do not cite or circulate without permission  10 
 
 
 
A last comment is dedicated to the following question: should the fact of knowing the use of 
proceeds of a financial product or service – that is, whether the funds are intended for general 
corporate purposes or whether they will be used for a specific investment or project – affect the type 
of human rights due diligence required to a financial institution? According to the Thun Group, the 
two situations should be treated differently. On the one hand, if the clients need the funds for 
general corporate purposes (such as strengthening the working capital), ‘the bank should look for 
management systems and structures on the client’s side that demonstrate the company’s ability to 
identify, manage and respond adequately to general human rights issues across all assets and 
operations in the various countries the client may be active’ (15). On the other hand, if the funds are 
intended for a defined purpose, such as to develop a new coal mine or a hydropower dam, ‘the 
potential impact of these specific investments on the human rights of affected rights-holders should 
be assessed in addition to the company’s general management of human rights’ (15). The Berne 
Declaration is right to criticise that a ‘procedural’ scan is not sufficient when funding for general 
corporate purposes is provided. The NGO argues that banks ‘often finance projects in areas where 
human rights violations are commonplace, such as mines, oil fields or chemical plants. Even when 
funding is for non-determined purposes, the activities of the company at stake often reveal more 
about its human rights record that the procedures written on paper’.50 BankTrack points to an 
additional problem. Victims of corporate human rights abuses and NGOs that support them ‘usually 
raise their voices against specific investments rather than commenting on the processes of the 
company involved’. The result of the proposal by the Thun Group would be that ‘their voices 
remain unheard in the due diligence process’.51 
 
4. General shortcomings 
The Thun Group’s discussion paper suffers from four general shortcomings. First, it does not 
recognise the full range of human rights abuses which banks can be involved in. Second, it ignores 
an issue as fundamental as access to effective remedy. Third, it circumvents the ‘Foundational 
Principles’ and the Principles on ‘issues of context’. Lastly, it shows a poor understanding of the 
role to be played by effective engagement with affected stakeholders. 
 
4.1. The subsidiary approach 
A Chief Executive Officer (CEO) briefing on human rights prepared by the UN Environment 
Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) in 2008 listed the following three core areas of interaction 
between financial services and human rights:  
 where a customer’s business causes or contributes to human rights violations or its 
products/services are used for such purposes (for example, military equipment);  
 where project finance lending for large projects causes or contributes to human rights 
violations; and  
 where financial services facilitate capital flight and money laundering.52 
                                                 
50
 Berne Declaration, “‘Groupe de Thoune’: Les Banques Reconnaissent Enfin L’importance Du Respect Des Droits 
Humains Dans Leurs Activités,” October 2, 2013, http://www.evb.ch/fr/p25021647.html. 
51
 BankTrack, BankTrack on the Thun Group Paper on Banks and Human Rights, December 2013, 5. 
52
 UNEP Finance Initiative, “CEO Briefing,” June 2008, 4. 
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The approach of the CEO briefing perfectly represents what Mary Dowell-Jones considers one of 
the biggest problems in the current thinking on the relationship between banks and human rights: 
the ‘subsidiary approach’, i.e., the perspective that ‘financial institutions and human rights only 
come into contact with each other through the funding of companies in other sectors (for example 
mining) who may be directly violating rights’.53  
The Thun Group falls victim of this erroneous belief too. The largest sections of the paper are 
dedicated to investment banking (e.g. loans to other companies) and asset management (e.g. 
ownership of other companies). Even the third main section – dedicated to retail banking – is 
mostly focused on the risks deriving from ‘association with politically sensitive clients associated 
with human rights controversy’ and ‘association with clients who are the owners of companies 
involved in human rights controversies, or who hold influential directorships in such companies’ 
(12). The conclusions of the document are revealing: business and human rights is ‘a complex issue 
for banks as most of their human rights impacts arise via the actions of their clients and are 
addressed through influence, leverage and dialogue rather than through direct action from the banks 
themselves’ (20).54 
This perspective is problematic because the ways in which banks can have adverse human rights 
impacts are numerous. First of all, it is important for enterprises ‘to look beyond the most obvious 
groups and not assume, for instance, that the challenges lie in addressing impact on external 
stakeholders while forgetting direct employees’.55 Even though health and safety problems are rare 
in the financial sector, they are not impossible. In November 2012, a 21-year-old intern at Merrill-
Lynch (part of Bank of America) died suddenly after reportedly working 72 hours straight, 
prompting the company to ‘review working conditions’.56 Cases of discrimination are more 
                                                 
53
 Dowell-Jones, “Financial Institutions and Human Rights,” 423. A rare exception can be found in an interview to 
Mark Harding, former General Counsel of Barclays, who affirmed: “We focused on three areas of impact: our role as an 
employer, as a purchaser of goods and services, and as a provider of financial services to clients. We found that many of 
our policies and practices already took account of human rights issues without explicitly referencing human rights. We 
had sound policies and requirements covering aspects such as discrimination, diversity, bullying and harassment, health 
and safety, and a range of other human rights-relevant issues”: Mark Harding, “Banking on Human Rights,” The 
Business and Human Rights Review 1 (2012): 4. A recent report by KPMG is also laudable as it highlights three areas 
that hold the highest risk with regard to human rights: consumers’ activities, employee management and supply chain 
management: KPMG, Human Rights in the Banking Sector, 2013, 14. 
54
 See also the way in which the document is introduced on the website of Credit Suisse: “[a]s the discussion paper 
explains, the majority of human rights impacts of banks result from the activities of their clients”. Credit Suisse, “Banks 
Helping to Respect Human Rights: Commitment,” October 2, 2013, https://www.credit-suisse.com/ch/en/about-
us/corporate-responsibility/news/commitment.article.html/article/pwp/news-and-expertise/2013/09/en/bank-helping-to-
respect-human-rights.html. This view is surprising because in other contexts banks have recognised their direct impacts 
on employees and customers. Credit Suisse itself, in the same webpage of the previous statement, argues: “Credit 
Suisse”s most direct link to human rights issues is in its working relationship with its employees and where we can 
exercise the greatest influence over such issues’. Gaia Ghirardi, head of Group Sustainability at UniCredit, recognises 
that “[o]f course banks are in a position to directly abuse the human rights of their employees and customers”: Ghirardi, 
“Understanding and Managing the Financial Sector’s Responsibilities in Terms of Human Rights: The UniCredit 
Experience,” 67. 
55
 OHCHR, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide, 37. 
56
 Tom Sykes, “Did Bank of America Merrill Lynch Intern Moritz Erhardt Die of Stress?,” The Daily Beast, November 
22, 2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/11/22/did-bank-of-american-merrill-lynch-intern-moritz-erhardt-
die-of-stress.html; Shiv Malik, “Moritz Erhardt Intern Death Spurs Bank of America Merrill Lynch Review,” The 
Guardian, August 23, 2013, sec. Business, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/aug/23/intern-death-bank-of-
america-merrill-lynch. 
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frequent. Banks are well-known for a ‘macho’ culture which ‘holds women back’.57 For example, in 
June 2011 the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia approved a $32 million settlement of 
a national gender discrimination case against Wachovia Securities, now known as Wells Fargo 
Advisors.
58
 According to the complaint, the discrimination deprived 3,000 women financial 
advisors of opportunities to develop business by, among other things, denying them a fair share of 
account distributions, fair treatment in investment partnerships and opportunities to purchase books 
of business from other financial advisors, and fair consideration in other mentoring and marketing 
opportunities.
59
 
Banks can also discriminate against their customers. The Thun Group cursorily acknowledges this 
issue by highlighting that ‘most multinational banks will have ... anti-discrimination policies 
(diversity and inclusion policies relating to clients, suppliers and employees) (12). However, the 
magnitude of the problem would require a much more detailed examination. A report by Noreena 
Hertz published in November 2011 shows that banks in the United Kingdom are discriminating 
against female customers, in particular pregnant women and women on maternity leave seeking 
mortgages, and against female entrepreneurs seeking loans.
60
 On the same day, the Deputy Prime 
Minister Nick Clegg announced an immediate investigation into banks’ lending practices.61 On 
similar lines, in July 2012 Wells Fargo agreed to pay $175 million to settle charges that it 
discriminated against thousands of blacks, Latinos, and other minority borrowers between 2004 and 
2009. The U.S. Justice Department had accused the bank, the country’s largest mortgage lender, of 
charging minority borrowers higher interest rates and fees on home loans than it charged white 
borrowers with similar credit ratings.
62
 
The document by the Thun Group also deliberately ‘focuses on the human rights implications 
arising from banks’ business relationships with clients, and not on the broader impacts of the 
banking industry on society’ (3). The consequence of this choice is that the document never 
mentions the far-reaching human rights implications of the recent financialisation of the world 
economy – that is, the process whereby financial markets, financial institutions, and financial elites 
gain greater influence over economic policy and economic outcomes.
63
 Adverse human rights 
impacts have principally been linked to banks’ activities in derivatives markets. On the one hand, 
bad risk management by global banks can exacerbate financial crises and thus provoke significant 
‘collateral damage’ in the enjoyment of economic and social rights by the most vulnerable segments 
                                                 
57
 Julia Kollewe, “Banks’ Macho Culture ‘Holds Women Back,’” The Guardian, March 12, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/mar/12/women-management-ftse-100-firms. See also Elizabeth Rigby and 
George Parker, “City ‘needs Women’ to Fight Macho Culture,” Financial Times, September 5, 2011. 
58
 Carter et al v. Wells Fargo Advisors LLC et al, U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, No. 09-01752. 
59
 Some banks have recognised the importance of non-discrimination in their individual approaches. For instance, 
UniCredit’s “Integrity Charter” banks discrimination on the grounds of sex, age, race, political opinion or trade-union 
activity. Most recently, additional principles and rights regarding diversity and inclusion have been set forth in the 
“Joint Declaration on Equal Opportunities and Non Discrimination” signed by the UniCredit European Works Council 
and the bank’s management. Ghirardi, “Understanding and Managing the Financial Sector’s Responsibilities in Terms 
of Human Rights: The UniCredit Experience,” 69. 
60
 Noreena Hertz, Women and Banks: Are Female Customers Facing Discrimination? (Institute for Public Policy 
Research, November 10, 2011). 
61
 Elizabeth Rigby, “Clegg Orders Review into How Banks Treat Women,” Financial Times, November 9, 2011. 
62
 Charlie Savage, “Wells Fargo to Settle Mortgage Bias Charges,” The New York Times, July 12, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/business/wells-fargo-to-settle-mortgage-discrimination-charges.html. 
63
 Gerald A. Epstein, Financialization and the World Economy (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005); Thomas I. Palley, 
Financialization: What It Is and Why It Matters (The Levy Economics Institute, 2007). 
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of the world population.
64
 Estimates by the International Labour Organisation and the World Bank 
suggest that the 2007 financial crisis forced 27 million workers to lose their job and 64 million 
people to fall under the poverty line.
65
 On the other hand, speculation in commodity derivatives can 
drive up food prices around the world, with devastating consequences for the right to an adequate 
standard of living of millions of low-income families in food-importing countries.
66
 Researchers 
and NGOs have offered strong evidence that recent peaks in food prices were the consequence not 
only of increased demand from rapidly growing emerging economies, biofuels production, and 
weather events, but also of structural changes in the trading of commodity derivatives.
67
 According 
to Olivier de Schutter, a significant role in the price spikes of the last few years ‘was played by the 
entry into markets for derivatives based on food commodities of large, powerful institutional 
investors such as hedge funds, pension funds and investment banks, all of which are generally 
unconcerned with agricultural market fundamentals’.68 
Silence on these issues is disappointing because there is a desperate need to discuss banks’ 
responsibilities in the context of financial crises and commodity speculation.
69
 As highlighted by 
Mary Dowell-Jones and David Kinley, human rights due diligence cannot easily be applied to these 
situations. Daunting questions include:  
does it require that financial entities disinvest from certain markets that may be overheating 
because the attendant systemic risks may well prove extremely detrimental to human rights 
should they materialise, even in the face of huge uncertainty as to the likelihood of this? How 
does this interact with a bank’s responsibilities to its shareholders? Would doing so only 
destabilise the markets sooner rather than later?
 70
 
                                                 
64
 Mary Dowell-Jones and David Kinley, “Minding the Gap: Global Finance and Human Rights,” Ethics & 
International Affairs 25, no. 02 (2011): 183–210; Mary Dowell-Jones, “International Finance and Human Rights: Scope 
for a Mutually Beneficial Relationship,” Global Policy 3, no. 4 (2012): 467–70. 
65
 ILO, Global Employment Trends 2011: The Challenge of a Jobs Recovery (Geneva, 2011), ix; World Bank, Global 
Monitoring Report 2010: The MDGs after the Crisis (Washington, 2010), 6. 
66
 John Richardson, Professor at the American University, founded the Initiative for Human Rights in Business to 
inform investors of the human rights risks associated with commodities speculation, to identify the investors and 
institutions involved in this speculative trading, and to address the failure of states to prevent these trading abuses and 
the resulting harm to populations in need: John Richardson, “Initiative for Human Rights in Business,” 2013, 
http://ihrib.org/site/jupgrade/blog/. 
67
 See World Development Movement, The Great Hunger Lottery - How Banking Speculation Causes Food Crises, July 
2010, http://www.wdm.org.uk/food-speculation/great-hunger-lottery; Friends of the Earth Europe, “Farming Money: 
How European Banks and Private Finance Profit from Food Speculation and Land Grabs,” January 2012, 
http://www.foeeurope.org/farming-money-Jan2012. Markus Henn collected more than 100 articles and reports 
demonstrating the adverse consequences of commodity speculation: Markus Henn, Evidence on the Negative Impact of 
Commodity Speculation by Academics, Analysts and Public Institutions (WEED, June 14, 2012). In January 2014 the 
European Parliament and the EU Presidency agreed on new regulations that would cap trading of some commodity 
derivatives (linked to wheat, corn, soybean and sugar), ban unregulated trading and establish tighter rules for high-
frequency trading: Mark Tran, “EU Curb on Food Speculation Gets Qualified Welcome from Activists,” The Guardian, 
January 15, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/jan/15/eu-curb-food-speculation-activists. 
68
 Olivier De Schutter, Food Commodities Speculation and Food Price Crises. Regulation to Reduce the Risks of Price 
Volatility, Briefing note by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, September 2010, 1. 
69
 The absence of the topic of food speculation is also surprising given that in February 2013 Barclays stopped 
speculative trading of agriculture commodities as part of an effort to scale back businesses that risk its reputation: Maria 
Kolesnikova and Isis Almeida, “Barclays Stops Speculative Agricultural Commodity Trading,” Bloomberg, February 
12, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-12/barclays-stops-speculative-agricultural-commodity-trading-2-
.html. 
70
 Mary Dowell-Jones and David Kinley, “The Monster Under the Bed: Financial Services and the Ruggie Framework,” 
in The Un Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation, ed. Radu Mares 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 206. 
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The problem lies not only in the opacity and complexity of many financial instruments. Addressing 
the questions above would also ‘require a foray into systemic dynamics and the issue of collective 
action/collective responsibility. There are many cases in finance where what would be harmless 
activity when conducted by a few market participants in small numbers turns into a powder keg of 
risk for everyone, including the global poor, when it attracts large numbers of players.
71
  
In sum, ‘existing initiatives like the Equator Principles cannot simply be scaled up to deal with the 
system as a whole’.72 As highlighted by the Institute for Human Rights and Business, ‘at the same 
time as the UN Guiding Principles have been developed with a strong emphasis on accountability to 
individuals whose human rights have been abused, the financialisation of many sectors has been 
moving the world in the opposite direction where accountability of a particular company for the 
impact of operations becomes harder and harder to pin down. How to reconcile these approaches 
will require innovative thinking’.73 
The discussion paper is also silent with respect to lobbying, notwithstanding the facts that (1) 
research by academics and NGOs has demonstrated that banks frequently ‘capture’ regulators and 
heavily influence regulation (both in the US and in Europe),
74
 and (2) the issue is explicitly covered 
by the Human Rights Council. According to the GPs, ‘business enterprises need to strive for 
coherence between their responsibility to respect human rights and policies and procedures that 
govern their wider business activities and relationships. This should include, for example, ... 
lobbying activities where human rights are at stake.
75
 The Thun Group should take inspiration from 
the activities of a group of responsible investors who energetically engage with law-makers, 
regulators and other business on several human rights issues (including supply chain problems in 
Bangladesh, conflict minerals reporting in the US and civil litigation under the Alien Tort Claims 
Act) and publicly report on their lobbying practices.
76
 
This list of potential human rights abuses is not even complete: space constraints preclude from 
addressing issues as important as financial exclusion,
77
 consumer protection
78
, the effect of fees and 
                                                 
71
 Ibid., 207. Problems of collective action can also arise in other circumstances. According to Roger Leese, Rae 
Lindsay and Steve Nickelsburg, implementation of the GPs “is likely to be particularly challenging and complex where 
multiple parties are involved, such as in syndications”: Leese, Lindsay, and Nickelsburg, Business and Human Rights: 
Emerging Issues for Financial Institutions, 2. 
72
 Mary Dowell-Jones and David Kinley, The UN Framework on Business and Human Rights: The Importance of 
Financial Institutions (Submission to the new UN Working Group on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other  Business Enterprises, 2011), 3. 
73
 Institute for Human Rights and Business, Investing the Rights Way: A Guide for Investors on Business and Human 
Rights, 58. Rae Lindsay agrees that there is “greater familiarity with these concepts around project finance ... But trying 
to apply this across sectors, businesses, products and geographies is not necessarily straightforward and requires a lot 
more thought”: Leese, Lindsay, and Nickelsburg, Business and Human Rights: Emerging Issues for Financial 
Institutions, 2. 
74
 Barry Herman, Regulating Financial Sectors for Development and Social Justice (New York: Social Justice in Global 
Development and the New School, April 24, 2013), 4; SOMO, Taking Lobbying Public: The Transparency of Dutch 
Banks’ Lobbying Activities, December 2013. 
75
 Ruggie, Guiding Principles, GP 16. 
76
 Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, “A Year After Rana Plaza, Investors Call for Transparency,” April 24, 
2014, http://www.iccr.org/year-after-rana-plaza-investors-call-transparency; Ben DiPietro, “Report Sets Expectations 
for Conflict Minerals Reporting,” Wall Street Journal, September 5, 2013, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/09/05/report-sets-expectations-for-conflict-minerals-reporting/; Boston 
Common Asset Management, Investor Statement for Human Rights and in Support of the U.S. Alien Tort Statute, 
October 2, 2012, www.bostoncommonasset.com/news/Investor-Statement-ATS-FINAL.pdf. 
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Trust Rebuilt?, 32. 
    DRAFT – Please, do not cite or circulate without permission  15 
 
 
 
charges on personal savings,
79
 land grabbing,
80
, tax avoidance,
81
 and corruption.
82
 Yet, it shows the 
inadequacy of the approach chosen by the Thun Group. According to Christian Leitz, head of 
corporate responsibility at UBS, the Group ‘took a conscious decision to focus on those elements 
that are most relevant for the business of a bank … Deliberately, we did not venture into business 
areas that are not core business activities of the banks involved in the Thun Group. And, also 
deliberately, we did not address issues that are non-specific for the banking industry, such as supply 
chain screening or employment practices.
83
 The question is the following: are not retail banking and 
derivatives trading a core business activity of the seven banks? As seen above, the GPs require that 
companies priorities their action on the basis of the severity of their impacts, including their scope, 
that is, the number of individuals that are affected. These numbers are in the range of thousands for 
cases of discrimination, and in the range of millions for financial crises and food prices volatility.  
 
4.2. Access by victims to effective remedy 
The document by the Thun Group focuses exclusively on GPs 16-21 and therefore intentionally 
avoids the ‘need for greater access by victims to effective remedy’ – the last pillar of the three-
pronged governance framework proposed by Ruggie. This is disappointing because the UN 
document is clear that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights includes expectations 
regarding remedial action. GP 22 states that ‘[w]here business enterprises identify that they have 
caused or contributed to adverse impacts, they should provide for or cooperate in their remediation 
through legitimate processes’.84 GP 29 adds that ‘business enterprises should establish or participate 
in effective operational-level grievance mechanisms for individuals and communities who may be 
adversely impacted’.85 
Representatives from the seven banks advanced three different arguments to defend their decision 
to circumvent remediation. First, the discussion paper claims to focus on those GPs that are ‘most 
relevant to banks’ potential adverse impacts on human rights’ (3). This justification is fallacious 
because the UN document is clear that the GPs are ‘an inter-related and dynamic system of 
preventative and remedial measures’, and all three pillars should be implemented simultaneously.86 
As a matter of fact, even the best policies and practices may not prevent from accidentally causing 
or contributing to adverse human rights impacts. This is why Ruggie affirmed that business 
enterprises conducting human rights due diligence ‘should not assume that, by itself, this will 
automatically and fully absolve them from liability for causing or contributing to human rights 
abuses’.87 In sum, if prioritisation is possible to tackle the most severe human rights impacts, the 
option is not available for allegedly ‘most relevant’ GPs.  
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 Herman, Regulating Financial Sectors for Development and Social Justice. 
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 Dowell-Jones, “Financial Institutions and Human Rights,” 452. 
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Grabbing Crisis in Cambodia and Laos, 2013. 
81
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 Ruggie, Guiding Principles, GP 22. 
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 Ibid., GP 29. 
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 Ibid., Para. 6. 
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Second, the seven banks declared to concentrate on the GPs which ‘tend to be most challenging to 
implement’ (5). This argument is invalid because recent experience with the Compliance 
Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) – the independent recourse mechanism for the IFC and the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency – has shown that assuring effectiveness of accountability 
mechanisms actually represents one of the trickiest aspects of the implementation strategy of the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights by financial institutions.
88
 In addition, the GPs are 
clear that ‘[i]ndustry, multi-stakeholder and other collaborative initiatives that are based on respect 
for human rights-related standards should ensure that effective grievance mechanisms are 
available’.89 The Equator Principles, the most important industry-led initiative on sustainable 
banking, still have no accountability and compliance mechanism where affected stakeholders could 
file complaints against non-compliant banks.
90
  
Third, Mercedes Sotoca, head of environmental and social risk at ING, noted that in most cases 
where a bank is potentially linked to a human rights impact, ‘the impact will have been caused not 
by the bank itself, but by its client. Therefore, the client is in a better position to provide access to 
remedy, and depending on the type of its relationship with or its service to the client, the bank may 
be able to exert influence on the client’s approach to access to remedy’.91 This statement can be 
challenged on two grounds. On the one hand, the previous section has amply demonstrated that it is 
not true that in most cases where a bank is potentially linked to a human rights abuse, the adverse 
impact will have been caused not by the bank itself but by its client. Suffice it here to remember the 
numerous cases of gender discrimination against employees and customers. On the other hand, 
increasing recourse to the CAO shows that bank’s clients that abuse human rights are not always 
willing to provide effective remedy to victims. It is therefore important that banks establish their 
own mechanism in order to provide rights-holders affected by bank-supported projects and 
activities a last resort remedy. 
As a final point on the issue of access to remedy, it is important to recall that accountability and 
grievance mechanisms are not only part of the remediation pillar of the GPs. They also feature as 
critical elements to assess and track human rights impacts within due diligence processes. In 
Ruggie’s words, they provide ‘a channel for those directly impacted by the enterprise’s operations 
to raise concerns when they believe they are being or will be adversely impacted. By analysing 
trends and patterns in complaints, business enterprises can also identify systemic problems and 
                                                 
88
 See, for example, the controversy over the CAO report that strongly criticised the IFC for its $30 million loan to a 
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adapt their practices accordingly’.92 This means that, even in the absence of a specific section on 
remediation, the due diligence focus of the Thun Group’s discussion paper should have required an 
analysis of grievance mechanisms anyway. Unfortunately, this is not the case. 
  
4.3. Foundational principles and issues of context 
The Thun Group’s document not only circumvents the issue of access to remedy but also ignores 
the five ‘foundational principles’ (GPs 11-15) and the two principles that deal with ‘issues of 
context’ (GPs 23-24). The reason behind this ‘amnesia’ is likely to be related to the presence of 
strong statements in favour of remediation responsibilities. According to GP 15, in order to meet 
their responsibility to respect human rights, ‘business enterprises should have in place policies and 
processes appropriate to their size and circumstances, including ... processes to enable the 
remediation of any adverse human rights impacts they cause or to which they contribute’.93 The 
Commentary to GP 11 emphasises that addressing adverse human rights impacts requires ‘taking 
adequate measures for their prevention, mitigation and, where appropriate, remediation”.94 The 
problem is that, acting this way, the Thun Group overlooks other important aspects of the corporate 
responsibility to respect. 
First of all, the discussion paper misses the opportunity to reiterate that banks ‘may undertake other 
commitments or activities to support and promote human rights, which may contribute to the 
enjoyment of rights. But this does not offset a failure to respect human rights throughout their 
operations’.95 This is particularly important because the sustainability reports of the great majority 
of banks still focus on philanthropic activities.
96
 In the context of human rights ‘there is no 
equivalent of a carbon off-set for harm caused to human rights: a failure to respect human rights in 
one area cannot be cancelled out by a benefit provided in another’.97 
Second, the suggestion on how to solve potential conflicts between international human rights law 
and local regulations is only partially in line with the GPs. According to Thun Group, a bank ‘may 
apply international human rights standards wherever possible but if doing so means that its 
employees in a particular jurisdiction are acting in breach of local law and may be subject to legal 
retribution, then it may decide to comply with local law and seek alternative means of compliance 
with accepted standards’ (5). This statement can be criticised for two reasons. On the one hand, 
BankTrack is right to argue that ‘bank employees are not forced by governments to maintain a 
specific activity or client relationship’. As such, ‘legal retribution in the event that they terminate a 
business relationship because of human rights concerns is unlikely. To prioritise local law over 
universal standards and disguise this as protection of employees is an unnecessary weakening of, 
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and diversion from, the Guiding Principles’.98 On the other hand, the GPs explicitly request 
business enterprise not only ‘to respect the principles of internationally recognized human rights to 
the greatest extent possible in the circumstances’, but also ‘to be able to demonstrate their efforts in 
this regard’.99 The communication aspect is forgotten in the Thun Group’s document. 
Lastly, the Thun Group describes the GPs as ‘law in the making’. The seven banks argue that 
‘although the Guiding Principles are not binding in law, they are more than simple voluntary 
guidelines. They are a good example of “hardening” soft law in the sense that they act as a catalyst 
to spark new policy requirements or binding regulation and are being multiplied by other 
international organisations and national legislators’ (4). Credit Suisse confirms this view by arguing 
that ‘recent developments demonstrate that international and national standard setting bodies are 
increasingly advocating new policy requirements and regulations on businesses with regards to 
human rights’ (emphasis added).100 Three recent developments are considered to be particularly 
relevant for banks: the update of the OECD Guidelines, the European Union (EU) Strategy on 
Corporate Social Responsibility 2011-2014 and the seven shared principles on investment by the 
EU and the US.
101
  
Even though this characterization of the GPs is, generally speaking, accurate, it leaves the reader 
with the impression that today banks cannot be held legally accountable for complicity in human 
rights abuses, and that everything that is ‘legal’ in the relationship between financial activities and 
human rights is prompted by the GPs. The message between the lines is that soft law is the present, 
hard law is just for the future.  
Legal precedents do not support this view. The landscape is, at best, mixed.
102
 During the apartheid 
era, Barclays and UBS provided loans to the South African government. In April 2009 Judge 
Scheindlin dismissed a lawsuit brought against the two banks by a group of South Africans on the 
basis of the following argument: money is not the means by which human rights abuses were 
committed (as guns would have been).
103
 Sabine Michalowski heavily criticised this line of 
reasoning. First of all, the Nuremberg cases that are used as authoritative case-law, together with 
recent developments in international law, do not justify such a far-reaching conclusion.
104
 Second, 
the approach used by Judge Scheindlin 
exempts whole industries, such as finance, from responsibility without requiring a case-by-case 
analysis. Indeed, even if the defendant provided loans with the specific intent to further gross 
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human rights violations, no liability would be incurred under Judge Scheindlin’s approach 
because the money provided was not the direct means to the violation.
105
 
Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky (together with other researchers) supports a case-by-case approach and 
adopted an innovative methodology to demonstrate the legal responsibilities of foreign financial 
institutions in supporting the macro-economic policies and military expenditures of repressive 
regimes in Latin America in the 1970s.
106
 Recent cases in Argentina and at the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone seem to move away from the absolute position suggested by Judge Scheindlin and 
align with the arguments by Michalowski and Bohoslavsky.
107
  
In sum, it is true that the GPs do not create new legal obligations. Yet, this does not mean that these 
obligations were necessarily non-existent before the adoption of the UN document. Actually, GP 23 
clearly states that ‘business enterprises should ... [t]reat the risk of causing or contributing to gross 
human rights abuses as a legal compliance issue’.108 Sector-based initiatives like the Thun Group’s 
discussion paper should do more to raise awareness among banks of the expanding web of potential 
corporate legal liability arising from extraterritorial civil claims, and from the incorporation of the 
provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in jurisdictions that provide for 
corporate criminal responsibility. 
 
4.4. Effective engagement with affected stakeholders: drafting process and recommendations 
Michael Addo argues that consultation with all key stakeholders laid at the base of the consensus 
that Ruggie so expertly secured on the GPs. The practical effect of this element was a ‘sense of 
inclusiveness and ownership of the GPs by all interested parties’.109 The Thun Group agrees with 
this narrative: ‘the particular strength of the Guiding Principles lies in the fact that they are the 
result of six years of robust multi-stakeholder consultations’ (4). Unfortunately, this lesson was not 
internalised by the seven banks.  
The discussion paper reports that its drafting process benefitted from support of the Competence 
Center for Human Rights at the University of Zurich as well as from critical feedback from a small 
group of individuals who had already been involved in drawing up the GPs.
110
 However, no 
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meaningful consultation took place with affected stakeholders and human rights NGOs. According 
to the Berne Declaration, ‘it is surprising and regrettable that the banks have not sought to include 
in their discussions human rights NGOs’.111 BankTrack confirms that no-one within ‘its network of 
40 civil society organisations working on banks was consulted, despite assurances from UBS and 
Credit Suisse that this would take place’.112  
The lack of effective engagement with affected stakeholders and/or their representatives is not only 
a shortcoming of the drafting process. One of the chief weaknesses of the discussion paper is the 
absence of comprehensive recommendations in favour of regular consultation with potential victims 
and/or organisations that operate in their defence. The document contains only one reference to 
engagement, consultation or dialogue with stakeholder groups. Under the “Reporting” section, the 
banks suggest that 
[i]n addition to its annual sustainability reporting, a bank should also make use of other 
communications channels to ensure a flow of relevant human rights-related information to its 
stakeholders. In contrast to reporting, which is usually “one-way” communication, conducting a 
dialogue with stakeholder groups on the topic of human rights will allow the bank to draw 
directly upon their feedback on relevant issues. Reporting to, and dialogue with, the bank’s own 
employees is also important to maintain awareness and commitment to applying consistent 
standards of human rights due diligence (19). 
Notwithstanding the absence of any distinction between stakeholders and affected stakeholders – a 
distinction that the text of the GPs clearly supports – this passage is commendable. The problem is 
that the OHCHR explicitly affirms that consultation at the stage of reporting is not sufficient:  
for any enterprise with a significant risk of human rights impact, this is just one of the ways in 
which it should engage with potentially affected stakeholders. Stakeholder engagement should 
also feature as a part of the enterprise’s efforts to assess its impact and to gain feedback on how 
effectively it has responded to impact. More generally, it is an important means of 
understanding the concerns and interests of affected stakeholders and of building effective 
relationships with these crucial groups on an ongoing basis.
113
  
Indeed, the GPs recommend effective engagement with affected stakeholders at all stages of the 
human rights due diligence process. Thus, consultation with potential victims and human rights 
NGOs would ‘advise how the wording of the draft policy commitment is likely to be viewed by 
these important stakeholders groups’.114 Furthermore, the assessment of actual and potential 
impacts should ‘[i]nvolve meaningful consultation with potentially affected groups and other 
relevant stakeholders, as appropriate to the size of the business enterprise and the nature and context 
of the operation’.115 This is important because it is not always self-evident what types of impacts are 
‘severe’ or ‘irremediable. When it is ‘less clear what human rights impact should be considered 
most severe or what factors might affect its remediability ... [w]here possible, enterprises are 
advised to engage with those whose rights are at risk in order to ensure they have understood what 
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impact they may have’.116 In a similar fashion, tracking responses should ‘[d]raw on feedback from 
both internal and external sources, including affected stakeholders’.117 The OHCHR clarifies that 
‘the purpose of engaging with relevant “internal and external sources, including affected 
stakeholders” in the tracking process is to draw as accurate a picture as possible of how well an 
enterprise is responding to human rights impact. It helps reduce the risk of bias that may arise when 
those being measured do the measuring.
118
  
 
5. Conclusion 
The relationship between banks and human rights is on the spotlight. The topic is regularly included 
in the yearly Top Ten List of Business and Human Rights Issues published by the Institute for 
Human Rights and Business.
119
 Civil society organisations and academics have showed the 
financial links between banks and abusive companies, repressive regimes and controversial 
products.
120
 Advocacy groups created ethical rankings of banks’ human rights policies and 
practices.
121
 Banks regularly feature among the winners and nominees of the Public Eye Awards.
122
  
Research on banks and human rights is also proliferating around the world.
123
 There is always a 
panel on the financial sector at the Global Forum on Responsible Business Conduct.
124
 UNEP FI 
created an Online Human Rights Guidance Tool for the Financial Sector which works as a ‘one stop 
shop’ resource, providing practical guidance to frontline business and client officers in the lending 
and investment community. The Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises – the UN body with the mandate to promote the 
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effective and comprehensive dissemination and implementation of the GPs – recently encouraged 
that ‘further study be made on applying the GPs in the financial sector’.125 
Notwithstanding these developments, a recent study conducted by Sustainable Advisory Services 
and commissioned by the Netherlands in support of the Proactive Agenda of the OECD Working 
Party on Responsible Business Conduct concluded that ‘awareness and implementation of the GPs 
by financial institutions is variable’, and that  
of the FIs which participated in the study that are familiar with the UNGPs, in general, most are 
at the early stages of understanding the implications for their institutions and many find its 
interpretation for their business challenging. FIs that have reviewed the UNGPs express a lack 
of clarity on how the scope and terminology of the UNGPs applies to their institutions.
126
 
The limited integration of human rights into banks’ operations is confirmed by the absence of 
human rights language in the most advanced sustainability initiatives in the financial sector. In 2009 
Standard Chartered commissioned two reports to gain an understanding of its social and economic 
impacts in Ghana and Indonesia respectively.
127
 None of the reports ever mentions human rights. In 
2011 the world’s leading sustainable banks created the Global Alliance for Banking on Values 
(GABV), a membership organisation with the mission to use the knowledge from these innovative 
banks and affiliates to provide alternatives for addressing the current crisis in our financial world 
impacting the overall sustainability of our society. GABV documents never make reference to the 
GPs.  
This situations explains why the publication of the Thun Group’s discussion paper The Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: An Interpretation for Banks represented a critical 
moment for the definition of the relationship between human rights and the financial sector: the 
document lays the foundations for the adoption of the first ever comprehensive guide on how 
universal banks should operationalise their responsibility to respect human rights. Human rights 
consultancies have even started offering their services to implement the suggestions offered by the 
discussion paper.
128
 
As the arguments offered by the Thun Group are likely to become the basis of future initiatives on 
integrating human rights into financial activities, as well as influence the implementation of the GPs 
by numerous banks,
129
 this article critically assessed the discussion paper and highlighted its major 
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strengths and shortcomings. This exercise was deemed essential in order to prevent that future 
achievements are inhibited by a false start. 
The article showed that the document contains numerous positive elements. Two of the most 
important ones have not been acknowledged yet. First, the seven banks recognise that the GPs 
represent ‘a new overarching single point of reference for business and human rights’ (4). The 
banks thus formally accept that the UN document is the starting point for any discussion on their 
responsibility to respect human rights. Second, the Thun Group acknowledges that human rights 
due diligence should be conducted not only because of the financial, reputational and legal 
advantages that it offers (the so-called ‘business case’ for human rights’). Rather, it is based on 
ethical grounds: respecting human rights is ‘the right thing to do’ (3).  
Notwithstanding the presence of these (and other) encouraging aspects, the discussion paper also 
suffers from numerous drawbacks. Above all, the Thun Group does not recognise the importance of 
effective engagement with affected stakeholders and/or their representatives, including trade unions 
and human rights NGOs. This limitation is far-reaching because the definition of banks’ human 
rights responsibilities still present abundant unresolved dilemmas, and Ruggie’s mandate 
demonstrated that long-lasting solutions can only be achieved through a participatory and inclusive 
approach. 
The thorny issues of ‘complicity’ and ‘leverage’ offer two interesting examples in this respect. First, 
the Thun Group takes no position on whether the different activities, operations, products and 
services of universal banks (such as lending, underwriting, managing assets or participating in 
derivatives markets) ‘cause’, ‘contribute’, or ‘are directly linked to’ potential adverse human rights 
impacts (or whether they should not be included in any of these categories). The question is not 
only terminological. According to the GPs, business enterprises should seek to prevent or mitigate 
only those adverse human rights impacts that are ‘directly linked to their operations, products or 
services by their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those impacts’.130 Does 
this category include beneficial complicity, that is, when a company benefits from human rights 
abuses even if it did not proactively aided or abetted their perpetration? If so, almost all banks’ 
activities and services would be covered: it is the business model of a bank to profit from lending 
money, owning shares, underwriting bonds, etc. In addition, the expectation of the GPs is that a 
company that causes or contributes to adverse human rights impacts act in a different way from a 
company whose operations, products or services are directly linked to human rights abuses through 
a business relationship. For instance, only the former should provide for, or cooperate in, 
remediation.
131
 How to qualify a revolving credit facility in favour of an extractive company which 
is displacing a local community without appropriate consultation or compensation as per 
international resettlement standards? Is this contributing to adverse human rights impacts or merely 
being linked to them?
132
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Second, the discussion paper argues that there is ‘a common public perception that banks have 
strong leverage over their clients’ behaviour and can, and should, seek to influence client actions to 
promote good practice. In practice, the degree of leverage is often a great deal less than popularly 
believed’ (5). Aldo Caliari disagrees: financial companies, ‘more than other companies, have the 
potential, with their change of behaviour, to influence the behaviour of other actors. That means 
they also should be upheld to a greater level of responsibility when they fail to do so’.133 BankTrack 
adds that banks ‘have the possibility to increase leverage, for example by the use of specific 
covenants outlining non-financial obligations of the client, as is standard practice with transactions 
that fall under the Equator Principles’.134 Who is right? 
None of these questions comes with simple, general answers. Rae Lindsay and Anthony Crockett 
acknowledge that identifying the point at which a bank ‘clearly has a responsibility to take steps to 
avoid or prevent an impact is not easy, and determining what steps should be taken is even 
harder’.135 Similar complications arise also with respect to other issues. For instance, how should 
the financial sector demonstrate its due diligence? Banks often claim to be constrained by a legal 
obligation to keep client information confidential.
136
 What level of transparency can reasonably be 
expected? The OHCHR offers no doubts on which path to follow in these complex circumstances: 
if an enterprise ‘cannot find immediate or obvious solutions, it will be well advised to engage with 
relevant expert stakeholders – including, where possible, any groups or individuals whose rights 
may be affected by the conflicting requirements’.137 
Notwithstanding the name (‘discussion paper’), there has been almost no publicity around the 
document prepared by the Thun Group. BankTrack emphasised that its release ‘was not 
accompanied by a launch event, press release or press conference, and accordingly, there has been 
minimal public discussion on its contents and implications’.138 This article hopes to trigger renewed 
attention on the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments offered by the Barclays, BBVA, Credit 
Suisse, ING Bank N.V., RBS Group and UBS. The seven banks have much to gain from an 
informed debate on these issues. The drafting process of the GPs has showed that clarity of external 
expectations – which is the basis of effective risk management – can be achieved only through 
inclusion and participation.  
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